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Abstract
This paper examines the role of uncertainty and imperfect local knowledge in
foreign direct investment. The main idea comes from the literature on investment
under uncertainty, such as Pindyck (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). We
empirically test .the value of waiting. with a dataset on foreign direct investment
(FDI). Many factors (e.g., political and economic regulations) as well as uncer-
tainty and the risks due to imperfect local knowledge, determine the attractiveness
of FDI. The uncertainty and irreversibility of FDI links the time interval between
permission and actual execution of such FDI with explanatory variables, includ-
ing information on foreign (home) countries and domestic industries. Common
factors, such as regulatory change and external shocks, may affect the uncertainty
when foreign investors make irreversible FDI decisions. We derive testable hy-
potheses from models of investment under uncertainty to determine those possible
factors that induce delays in FDI, using Korean data over 1962 to 2001.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: F21, G31, O16
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Irreversibility, Uncertainty, Imperfect
information, Investment Delay
I. Introduction  
 
The attractiveness and actual disbursement of foreign direct investment (FDI) into a given 
country depends on many factors, including political and economic conditions both in the host 
country and in the rest of the world. In particular, irreversible investment decisions under 
uncertainty affect the actual deployment of FDI.  
Recent work in options theory (Dixit, 1992; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996) 
show that the traditional net present value (NPV) approach to investment decisions ignores 
various embedded real options in such investment. In particular, this line of research 
demonstrates that uncertainty with irreversible investment makes delaying such investment 
valuable even with a positive NPV because the resolution of uncertainty provides a window of 
opportunity to improve the return on investment (Pindyck 1991). McDonald and Siegel (1986), 
Pindyck (1991), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and Trigeorgis (1996) provide analyses of the value 
of waiting for more information before actual commitment in investment decisions. 
Rivoli and Salorio (1996) extend the economics of uncertainty with an option theoretic 
application to foreign direct investment under uncertainty to examine the effect of irreversibility 
on the delay in foreign direct investment.1 They conclude that less foreign direct investment 
occurs when it becomes either more delayable or less reversible under uncertainty. They enrich 
the existing theories of foreign direct investment by asking “when” the investment actually 
occurs.  
Rajan and Marwah (1998) also examine the choice and timing of foreign direct 
investment, calculating the expected discounted profits from the various actions of the firm, 
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1 Buckley and Tse (1996) also apply real options to existing foreign direct investment theories. 
  
including the option to wait.2 They conclude that the government should improve the credibility 
of its liberalization program and should reduce the cost of foreign firms investing in their 
domestic economy. 
Bell and Campa (1997) and Campa (1994) employ real option modeling to examine the 
entry decision by firms. They examine whether increased volatility or uncertainty affects the 
entry decision. 
We test the main propositions from this theoretical literature on foreign direct investment 
under uncertainty, utilizing a Korean data set from 1962 to 2001. The data importantly include 
not only the date of actual foreign direct investment, but also the date that the Korean 
government gave permission for that investment. In particular, we empirically examine the effect 
of uncertainty on the duration from permission to execution of irreversible FDI into Korea.3 The 
dataset includes a variety of information such as investor identity, the share of foreign investor, 
the amount of FDI permitted, the host industry information, and the duration time between FDI 
permission and its disbursement.4
Pindyck (1991) developed a simple model to obtain possible conditions that influence the 
delay between FDI permission (now notification) and execution.5 Acquiring permission from the 
Korean government represents an option to enter, because foreign firms cannot actually invest 
without governmental permission. Once permission occurs, foreign firms still have the option to 
not invest immediately. In other words, foreign firms own an option to delay the actual 
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2 While they include the value (price) of the option in the calculation of the expected discounted profit for the firm, 
they do not explicitly specify the real option model to determine that value (price). 
3 Prior studies (Bell and Campa, 1997; Campa, 1994) were handicapped, since they did not possess information to 
calculate the duration. 
4 FDI occurs in Korea when a foreign investor holds more than 10 percent of equity capital with maturities of five 
years or more. 
5 The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy records two measures of FDI in Korea. 
  
investment. Compared with portfolio investment, foreign direct investment is irreversible, given 
that the salvage value of direct investment is so small due to the idiosyncratic nature of 
production equipment.  
Our analysis indicates that irreversibility and uncertainty induce delays in FDI 
disbursement. We also discover several additional interesting results that support theories of 
investment under uncertainty. First, the permitted amount does not affect duration and 
uncertainty. Second, higher foreign ownership implies shorter duration time and, thus, lower 
uncertainty. Third, familiarity with the Korean environment reduces the uncertainty in 
performing FDI.6 Thus, more experience implies shorter duration. Fourth, the permission date 
does not significantly shorten or lengthen duration. That is, neither the credibility of the Korean 
liberalization program nor the reputation of the policy makers responsible for that program 
experience any significant change over the sample period. Fifth, FDI from China and Japan7 
enjoys shorter duration, while FDI from U.S. experiences longer duration. Sixth, the Asian crisis 
significantly increases uncertainty and generates longer duration. Finally, variations in duration 
across industries exist.  
Section 2 describes the basic theoretical model and examines the effect of uncertainty on 
FDI. Section 3 records the five phases of inward FDI development in Korea and the role of FDI 
in the Korean economy. Section 4 highlights the data on inward FDI, focusing, in detail, on the 
experience of the U.S., Japan, and China. Section 5 reports the formal duration analysis and one 
robustness check, and discusses the results. Section 6 concludes with policy implications.  
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6 The host country often signals its intentions by relaxing regulation and arranging other institutional favors. For 
example, China successfully attracted FDI, even though neighboring countries offered better deals. 
7 The Japanese dummy variable proves insignificant, but negative, in the duration analysis, although significantly 
negative in the sensitivity analysis. See later in the text and Table 3. 
  
II. Theoretical Framework: Investment under Uncertainty 
Assume that a foreign firm gets permission from the local government for direct investment at 
time 0 . Now, the firm owns the rights to an investment project and the option to invest in that 
project at anytime. If the firm exercises the option at time , then assume that the return to 
the firm from the initial investment of 
( 0)t >
I  for the project equals . More specifically, the 
investment project  follows the geometric Brownian-motion process  
tV
tV
dV Vdt Vdµ σ ε= + , (1) 
 where µ  and σ  equal constant parameters and ε  follows a Wiener process.  
Once actual investment or disbursement occurs, the value of the project equals  at time 
. Prior to actual disbursement, the value of the real option to invest equals , where the 
current value of the project equals V . Therefore, define V* such that 
tV
t ( )F V
( )F V V I∗ ∗= − , (2) 
where V  equals the threshold value of the project that just supports the investment without 
further waiting. That is, the investment decision rule says that the foreign firm actually takes an 
irreversible action of disbursement, if and only if,  exceeds V
∗
tV
∗ .8  
Pindyck (1991) shows that  satisfies the following differential equation: ( )F V
2 21 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
2 VV V
V F V r VF V rF Vσ δ+ − − = ,  (3) 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives, r  denotes the risk-free interest rate, and δ  denotes 
the opportunity cost of delaying the actual investment. Together with the boundary conditions 
that , , and (0) 0F = ( )F V V I∗ ∗= − ( ) 1VF V ∗ = , equation (3) possesses a unique solution  
                                                 
 
8 Note that the usual NPV rule that the (discounted) value of the investment must equal its cost now becomes that 
the (discounted) value of the investment must exceed its cost by at least the real option value for waiting 
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( ) ( )[ ]VF V V I
V
β∗
∗= − , and (4) 
1
V Iββ
∗ = − , (5) 
where 
211 2 (2 22 2 2
rr r )δδβ σσ σ
−− −= − + + . Both  and V( )F V ∗  increase, if σ  increases. In other 
words, uncertainty increases the value of a firm’s investment opportunities, but decreases the 
amount of actual investing that the firm will does, since the threshold value, V*, rises.  
Pindyck’s (1991) analysis implies that higher uncertainty induces firms to invest less and 
to wait longer, on average. Intuitively, firms will wait when the benefit of waiting exceeds the 
cost of waiting. Likewise, firms will invest when the expected benefit exceeds the expected cost. 
More uncertainty makes additional investment less attractive. Thus, firms will invest less, given 
higher uncertainty.  
Rivoli and Salorio (1996) and Trigeorgis (1996) show that competition alters the value of 
waiting. Firms will invest sooner, rather than later, if danger exists of preemption by competitors. 
In other words, firms without market power cannot enjoy the delay option, because competitive 
pressures make the cost of waiting higher. The prior discussion leads to the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1:  The more competition among foreign entrants, the more likely firms will invest 
sooner. 
If firms possess good information about the local host country, investing firms face less 
uncertainty and will accumulate less new information. In other words, the benefits of waiting fall 
for firms more familiar with the local host country. We hypothesize that the firms will wait less, 
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if previous investment into Korea already exists. We also hypothesize that firms will wait less, if 
the foreign firm opts for a higher ownership ratio. Previous investment into Korea proxies for 
familiarity with local conditions. Higher ownership implies a higher commitment by foreign 
firms under uncertainty. Higher commitment implies either that firms exhibit risk-seeking 
behavior or know something about the local host country. Since we do not assume any specific 
attitude of firms toward risk, we associate higher ownership with better local knowledge. This 
leads to our second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: The more local knowledge firms possess, the more likely firms will invest sooner. 
Rajan and Marwah (1998) also provide a theoretical discussion of the foreign direct 
investment decision, including the possibility of “wait-and-see” behavior. They consider three 
alternative cases: (1) invest in the foreign market immediately, (2) do not invest in the foreign 
market, but serve that market with exports, and (3) wait before investing in the foreign market. 
Of course, the last strategy involves two choices while the firm waits: (i) invest in liquid assets or 
(ii) serve the foreign market with exports. Rajan and Marwah (1998) calculate the expected 
discounted profits for each strategy and consider the conditions under which each strategy is 
chosen. The “wait-and-see” strategy requires the use of the value (price) of the real option to 
wait. They merely hypothesize the existence of the value (price) of the real option, but do not 
describe the method of determining that real option value (price), such as Pindyck (1991).9
Rajan and Marwah (1998) conclude that policy makers need to consider strategies to 
improve the credibility of their liberalization program10 and to reduce the sunk costs that firms 
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9 Although Rajan and Marwah (1998) identify a reduced-form estimating equation, they do not collect data or 
perform any econometric tests. 
10 We add that the policy makers need to improve their reputation of not trying to extract additional revenue from 
firms investing in the domestic economy. That is, a time-inconsistency problem exists such that the policy makers 
possess an incentive to change the rules after the foreign firm invests. The problem conforms to a version of the 
repeated “trust game,” which we discuss latter in the text. 
  
incur with foreign direct investment. We hypothesize that the Korean government accumulates 
credibility and reputation over time. Thus, we proxy for credibility and reputation by the date of 
foreign direct investment permission. The later the date of permission, the higher the credibility 
and reputation. We also proxy for the sunk cost by the permitted foreign direct investment. This 
discussion leads to two additional hypotheses as follows: 
Hypothesis 3:  The more credible the liberalization program and the better the reputation of 
the policy makers responsible for implementing that liberalization program, the 
more likely firms will invest sooner. 
Hypothesis 4:  The higher the initial sunk cost (foreign direct investment), the more likely 
firms will invest later. 
III. Foreign Direct Investment in Korean Economic Development 
Korea attracts FDI due to convenient location for exporting into other, major Asian countries, 
well-established infrastructure, and skilled workers with strong educational background. Shortly 
after World War II, Korean policymakers did not view foreign direct investment favorably, 
perceiving that it exploited cheap land, labor, and raw materials for multinational corporations 
from industrialized countries. This attitude largely reflected the experience with Japanese 
colonization from 1910 to 1945. As a result, a variety of regulations were imposed to restrict 
FDI, creating a hostile environment for foreign investors.11  
Korea’s conversion to a friendlier environment for FDI initially resulted from external 
economic factors. The Korean government began liberalizing FDI regulations during the 1980s, 
when the Heavy and Chemical Industry Promotion Plan failed due to excessive reliance of 
chaebols, giant conglomerates of Korean business usually owned by a single family, on policy 
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11 The appendix provides a detailed discussion of the evolution of Korean FDI regulation. 
  
loans arranged by the government. The lifting of anti-FDI regulations continued through the 
1990s. When Korea joined the OECD in 1996, the FDI regime needed to correspond to 
international norms and regulations. Nevertheless, during this period, the Korean government’s 
stance toward FDI exhibited more tolerance than active promotion (Park, 2002).  
Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the Korean economy accepted foreign direct 
investment under similar rules as other OECD countries and foreign and domestic companies 
received the same treatment.12 FDI proved vital in growing the economy after the 1997 financial 
crisis, even though the inflow of foreign direct investment fell in 2001 largely as a result of the 
global economic slowdown (Kim, 2002).13
The process of liberalizing government regulation of FDI does not ensure success in 
promoting an investment boom. In simple terms, the situation represents a repeated “trust game,” 
where the government (player 1) and individual firms (players 2) participate in the game.14 That 
is, the firms must view the government’s liberalization program as credible, while the 
government must establish a reputation that it will commit to the new policies and will not 
renege on them. As noted in footnote 8, the government possesses an incentive for time 
inconsistency, since they can experience a short-run gain by extracting more revenue from the 
foreign firms who have invested in the domestic economy. Since the “trust game” repeats itself, 
albeit with new firms, the firms who have received permission to invest can penalize the 
government by not investing. The government and the firms can reach a cooperative Nash 
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12 The Asian financial crisis demonstrated to Korean policymakers that FDI possesses many advantages. Mainly, it 
secures long-term stable foreign capital instead of the short-term bank loans and other sources of foreign borrowing 
that Korea used before the crisis. Furthermore, the Korean government realized that FDI brings management 
expertise, new technology, and alliances with foreign partners. Consequently, the government enacted several 
investment promotion acts. 
13 Recently, China has competed vigorously with Korea to attract inward FDI. 
14 Rajan and Marwah (1998) also tell a game theory story, although their analysis uses the prisoner’s dilemma 
model. 
  
equilibrium when the threat of punishment imposes discounted costs higher than the potential 
discounted gains to the government. In sum, a credible government policy and reputable 
government policy makers can induce larger foreign direct investment with a shorter delay. 
IV. FDI Performance in Korea 
Foreign direct investment into Korea increased steadily from 1980 to 2001 along with average 
foreign ownership. Comparing performed to unperformed FDI, the average amount and the 
average ownership of performed FDI projects consistently exceed those of unperformed projects, 
except for the initial years. The reverse occurred in 1988, the year of the Seoul Olympic Games, 
and in the year of the Asian crisis (i.e., 1997). That is, average unperformed FDI substantially 
surpassed that of performed FDI in those two years.15 Unlike 1988, percentages of realized FDI 
in 1997, both in number of projects and in invested capital, reached their lowest levels. That 
outcome probably reflects the expected financial crisis, which actually unfolded at the end of 
1997, scaring away big investors and causing the postponement or cancellation of many 
registered projects. After the Asian financial crisis, the highest inflow of capital occurred in 1998 
with the percentage of realized capital soaring from 35.4 to 91 percent, and the realized number 
of projects increasing from 68.1 to 74.1 percent.16  
Those industries that attracted a large number of projects also enjoyed a high percentage 
of realized capital, ranging from 91 to 96 percent. Wholesale trade exhibited the highest average 
ownership (over 92 percent), while the electrical machinery manufacture showed the lowest 
(about 55 percent). When sorting industries by realized capital, wholesale trade, while attracting 
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15 Interestingly, the number of FDI projects approved by the Korean government increased sharply during two time 
periods, 1985 to 1987 and 1998 to 2000. While the percentage of performed FDI was over 97% during 1985 to 
1987, it was below 80% during 1998 to 2000, on average. 
16 In general, the number of realized projects steadily increased over time, decreasing slightly from 1989 to 1992. 
The percentage of realized projects, however, have decreased since 1962 with an abrupt drop in 1997.  
  
the largest number of projects, stands only in the tenth place. Chinese FDI concentrated in this 
industry, but most projects showed a relatively low value. Meanwhile, financial institutes rose 
from tenth to second place, sorting first by ownership and then by realized projects. 
Three countries lead foreign investors in the number of projects -- Japan, U.S., and China. While 
Japan and the U.S. have retained their top positions since 1962, China draws much attention as a 
potential investor after entering Korea nearly 30 years later.17
V. Empirical Results 
 
We employ duration analysis to test the four hypotheses in Section 2. Duration analysis explains 
the time between the permission for FDI to its actual disbursement.18 Most duration analyses 
must consider a key analytical problem called censoring, where the time between permission and 
disbursement is not complete (i.e., disbursement is censored). Generally, three reasons can cause 
censoring in our FDI analysis: (1) the investment is not executed before 2002, the ending point 
of the data; (2) the investment disbursement is not officially reported to the Korean government; 
and (3) the investment project withdraws after getting permission either due to uncertainty or 
some other internal reasons.  
We denote the random variable for a duration time of each FDI project by T, which 
equals the time difference between the permission date and the execution (disbursement) date. 
The censoring variable, δ, equals a dichotomous (0, 1) random variable, where δ = 1, if a FDI 
project is executed before 2002, and δ = 0, if it is not executed by the end of 2001. In other 
words, considering each FDI project, δ = 1 means execution while δ = 0 means censored.  
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17 The appendix provides a more detailed discussion about the FDI performance of Japan, the U.S., and China. 
18 Usually economists refer to the time variable as survival time, because it gives the time that an individual has 
“survived” over some follow-up period. On the other hand, the event is referred to as “failure”, because the kind of 
event of interest usually is death, disease incidence, or some other negative individual experience. 
  
The duration model is usually written in terms of the hazard function.19 The hazard 
function is of interest for the following reasons: (i) it gives insight about conditional failure 
(execution) rates, (ii) it can identify a specific parametric model form; and (iii) it provides the 
vehicle by which the mathematical modeling of duration data is carried out. The conditional 
hazard function h(t|Ti-1….., T0) equals the conditional risk of an event (execution) at time t. It 
gives the instantaneous expected rate per unit time for the event to occur, given that the event has 
not occurred up to ti-1: 
h(t|Ti-1….., T0)=  
0
lim→∆t t
tTttTtob
∆
≥∆+<≤ )|(Pr .   (6) 
Even though various methods exist to assess goodness of fit, uncertainty still remains 
about the appropriateness of a given parametric specification. 20  Cox (1972) developed a 
nonparametric robust approach for duration models with covariates X, the Cox proportional 
hazards (Cox PH) model that closely approximates the results for the correct parametric 
specification. A baseline hazard function h0(t) is modified multiplicatively by covariates so that 
the hazard function for any individual case is as follows: 
h(t, X)= h0(t) exp[β'X].     (7) 
We focus our interest on the proportional factors rather than the unspecified baseline hazard 
h0(t). We can estimate the parameter vector β without requiring estimation of h0(t) by 
maximizing a partial, rather than a complete, likelihood function.21 The term partial likelihood 
                                                 
 
19 Hazard functions possess the following properties: nonnegative and no upper bound. Four types of hazard 
functions are the most popular: exponential, increasing Weibull, decreasing Weibull, and lognormal hazard 
functions (duration models). 
 
20 Parametric approaches assume a parametric model for T, then estimate the unknown parameters for the survivor 
and the hazard functions such as exponential, gamma, Weibull, lognormal, Pareto distribution, and so on. For 
example, the Weibull hazard model takes the form h(t, X)= λ tα-1 exp[β’X], where X are covariates and the unknown 
parameters are λ, α, and β. Note that for the Weibull model, a baseline hazard function, h0(t) is given parametrically 
by λ tα-1. 
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means that the likelihood formula considers probabilities for those subjects that are censored. An 
expression for the hazard rate (HR) emerges from the regression coefficients by substituting with 
the Cox model formula: 
HR= )]('exp[
]'exp[)(
]'exp[)(
),(
),(
21
20
10
2
1 XX
Xth
Xth
Xth
Xth −== ββ
β . (8) 
The hazard ratio shows the shift of the baseline hazard. That is, if the hazard ratio equals 
one, no shift occurs in the baseline hazard and, thus, the explanatory variable does not affect the 
hazard ratio. If the hazard ratio exceeds (falls below) one, then the explanatory variable increases 
(decreases) the probability of failure and, thus, reduces (increases) duration.  
Columns 1 to 3 of table 3 reports the findings. First, the FDI size does not associate with 
a significant hazard ratio, contrary to Hypothesis 4. Therefore, it does not influence duration and 
uncertainty. Our estimate in this case may contain bias, since we employ the FDI permitted 
rather than the FDI actually disbursed. If the disbursed FDI systematically falls below the 
permitted FDI, our finding may falsely reject a significant effect. 
Second, higher ownership associates with a hazard ratio greater than one and, thus, with a 
higher probability of execution. Therefore, higher ownership implies shorter duration time and 
lower uncertainty.  
Third, familiarity with the local environment positively affects the hazard function (or 
hazard ratio exceeds 1) and reduces uncertainty.22 Thus, more experience in that industry from 
the same country implies shorter duration. These two results support Hypothesis 2. 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 The term partial likelihood is used because the likelihood formula considers probabilities for those subjects who 
are censored. 
 
22 The cumulative number of FDI projects carried out in previous years for each industry and investing country 
measures the local knowledge variable. For example, the experience from one country in one specific industry at the 
concerned time (e.g., year 2000) equals the cumulative number of performed FDI projects from 1962 up to that time 
(i.e., the end of 1999) for the same country within the same industry. 
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Fourth, the year of permission does not prove significant. That is, no evidence emerges 
that the credibility of the liberalization program or the reputation of the government to commit to 
that program improves or worsens over the sample period. This result does not support 
Hypothesis 3. 
Fifth, FDI from China enjoys shorter duration, while FDI from U.S. experiences a longer 
duration. FDI from Japan may possess shorter duration, but it is insignificant.23
Sixth, the Asian crisis significantly increases the hazard rate above one, implying shorter 
duration. Before the crisis, the Korean government implemented its liberalization program in a 
cautious, piecemeal approach. After the crisis, the government adopted policies to boost the 
inflow of foreign capital as much as possible. Thus, the finding proves consistent with the view 
that Korean government policies worked effectively to attract more foreign direct investment. 
Another interpretation suggests that the regulatory and bureaucratic barriers that had delayed 
actual disbursements before the crisis collapsed after the crisis. 
Finally, a large number of industry variations exist. The service sector represents the base 
industry in our regressions. Industries that require longer delay include fishing, manufacture of 
food products, basic metals, general construction, restaurants, hotels, and financial institutes. In 
contrast, industries that exhibit shorter delay include retail trade and wholesale-commission 
trade. Compared with other industries, the service industries in Korea traditionally encompass 
small- and medium-sized, labor-intensive, and not knowledge-intensive firms. In that sense, the 
retail trade and wholesale commission sectors probably experience more competition, explaining 
the shorter duration according to Hypothesis 1. 
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23 The Japanese dummy variable becomes significantly negative in the sensitivity analysis. See below and Table 3. 
  
We conduct one robustness check on the duration specification with a variation on the 
“wait-and-see” concept. That is, we construct a relative time span defined as individual duration 
relative to the industry-year average. This specification captures the possibility that a deviation 
from average may reflect the investor’s strategic intent. We first calculate the industry-year 
average duration time. Then, we divide the actual months of individual durations by that 
industry’s average value. Note that the variable does not measure duration, but proxies for 
"unusual delay", if it is larger than 1. This calculation incorporates differences coming from 
industry and time, a “relative wait-and-see” measure. Regression results, reported in the last two 
columns of Table 3 and adjusted by the Huber/White’s heteroscedastic robust procedures, 
confirm our findings in duration analysis except that both the Asian crisis dummy and the time 
trend prove insignificant and the dummy for Japan is now not only negative, but also significant.  
VI. Conclusion 
Foreign direct investment into Korea traveled through a variety of stages over the last 40 years, 
when the Korean economy opened to outside FDI investors. In particular, Korea attracted 
significant FDI after the Asian financial crisis. Swings in the number and size of inward FDI 
projects reflect uncertainty and lack of knowledge of local conditions by foreign investors.  
We contribute to the existing literature on investment under uncertainty with an empirical 
duration analysis on hosting FDI, and derive the testable hypotheses to identify possible factors 
inducing the delay of FDI between permission time (more recently, notification time) and actual 
arrival time. The permission, representing the commitment of foreign investors to invest, can be 
withdrawn either partially or fully before actual investment, depending on the change of 
investment environment, which can signal uncertainty. Our findings show that, while the amount 
of investment does not affect duration time, higher ownership and better local knowledge possess 
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positive effects, reducing uncertainty and duration. Further, the date of permission for FDI does 
not cause significant shorter or longer duration, supporting that the Korean government’s 
commitment to its liberalization program is credible and that the reputation of the policy makers 
responsible for that program is good. 
We also examine country and crisis dummy variables -- China, the U.S., Japan, and the 
Asian crisis. We discover that the FDI projects from China and possibly Japan possess shorter 
duration while the U.S. possesses longer duration and that the Asian crisis shortened the period 
between project permission and execution times. Two possible reasons may explain why 
investment from China and Japan occur more quickly than those from the United States. First, 
cultural similarities may reduce uncertainty faced by Chinese and Japanese investors. In other 
words, the United States does not share cultural and geographical proximity. Cultural and 
geographic proximity may allow investors to acquire local information and knowledge more 
easily and quickly. Thus, cultural and geographic proximity reduces uncertainty.  
Second, investors from the United States may face less fierce competition in Korea than 
China and Japan. Firms with market power can enjoy the option of delaying the decision while 
firms without market power must choose between “go now” or “don’t go” rather than “go now” 
or “go later,” because of possible preemption by competitors. From this perspective, longer 
waiting time implies less competitive pressure from the market. This interpretation implies that 
the firms from the United States enter Korea with superior technology, reputation, or other 
unique advantages that other competitors do not possess. On the other hand, firms from China, in 
particular, enter Korea mainly for “preemptive purposes” to acquire advanced technology or 
extend business networks earlier than other competitors.  
Several important policy ramifications emerge from our analysis. First, the credibility of 
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policy signals from host-country government greatly affects the behavior of foreign investors. 
Uncertainty perceived by foreign investors discourages the final commitment to enter the host 
country. If foreign investors observe confused, ambiguous, and inconsistent policy 
announcement, then the effectiveness of liberalization efforts (e.g., tax and other incentives) is 
seriously damaged. Therefore, the policy makers must provide credible, consistent, and clear 
policy signals to induce foreign investment effectively, which the Korean government seems to 
have done. 
Second, more competitive market environments provide a strong incentive for earlier 
investment for market preemption. Protected and non-competitive local markets provide limited 
incentives for foreign firms to enter early due to little competitive pressure. With a set of credible, 
consistent, and clear policy signals, the regulatory agencies must make the markets more open 
and competitive so that interested foreign investors feel the market pressure of early entry into 
the market.  
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Table 1. Restrictions on FDI in Korea during pre-liberalization period 
 
Rationale of prohibition Rationale of restriction Categories of restricted industries 
Public interests related business 
- Water supply service industry 
- Postal service industry 
- Telegraph and telephone 
service industry 
- Railway transportation service 
industry 
- Tobacco producing industry 
Industries harmful to health and 
sanitation of people and to 
preservation of environment 
Industries harmful to laudable 
customs 
Other industries that the related 
presidential decree prohibited  
- Newspaper publishing industry 
- Radio broadcasting industry 
- Cereal grains producing 
industry 
 
- Industries that are specially 
supported by the government 
- Industries that are required to 
consume excessive amount of 
energy or imported raw materials 
- Industries leading severe 
pollution 
- Gamble industries  
- Industries that affect the life 
style of farmers and fishermen 
- Inducement industries that are 
admitted to need a government 
protection in the aspect of 
industrial policies for a period 
 
- Industries peculiar to small or 
medium companies 
- Industries systematizing small 
or medium companies 
- Industries to be rationalized 
- Telegraph and telephone 
service industry, Railway 
transportation service industry, 
Industries manufacturing a 
construction equipment, an 
internal combustion engine, 
Industries manufacturing a 
motorcycle, an industrial truck, a 
shipping device, and non life 
insurance Industries 
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Table 2. Time trend of inward FDI in Korea  
 
 all cases   performed FDI  not performed FDI % realized % 
  average Average  average average average average in no of realized 
 count amount Ownership count amount ownership count amount ownership project capital 
1962 1 32899.0 14.00 1 32899.0 14.00   100.00 100.00 
1963 1 1682.0 21.00 1 1682.0 21.00   100.00 100.00 
1964 1 19190.0 50.00 1 19190.0 50.00   100.00 100.00 
1965 1 44.0 19.00 1 44.0 19.00   100.00 100.00 
1966 3 12372.7 75.00 2 18414.0 62.50 1 290.00 100.00 66.67 99.22 
1967 8 35769.1 58.28 7 40837.7 66.29 1 289.00 2.20 87.50 99.90 
1968 12 41362.6 69.95 11 45121.2 67.22 1 18.00 100.00 91.67 100.00 
1969 12 26147.3 42.50 12 26147.3 42.50   100.00 100.00 
1970 23 7786.7 54.02 23 7786.7 54.02   100.00 100.00 
1971 15 7142.3 56.97 14 7345.8 58.21 1 4293.00 39.60 93.33 95.99 
1972 52 7707.7 47.31 51 7622.8 47.37 1 12038.00 44.60 98.08 97.00 
1973 68 12939.3 45.16 68 12939.3 45.16   100.00 100.00 
1974 35 11686.7 45.45 33 11410.8 43.86 2 16239.50 71.60 94.29 92.06 
1975 14 8452.9 38.79 14 8452.9 38.79   100.00 100.00 
1976 14 1970.1 62.34 12 2242.3 62.94 2 337.00 58.70 85.71 97.56 
1977 14 21012.4 44.25 13 19115.9 44.59 1 45667.00 39.80 92.86 84.48 
1978 18 6270.1 59.11 18 6270.1 59.11   100.00 100.00 
1979 22 3839.2 49.39 21 4021.0 51.31 1 21.00 9.00 95.45 99.98 
1980 18 12373.6 57.39 18 12373.6 57.39   100.00 100.00 
1981 19 2592.9 54.32 19 2592.9 54.32   100.00 100.00 
1982 25 32213.0 58.47 25 32213.0 58.47   100.00 100.00 
1983 37 22852.7 62.49 35 24138.8 63.28 2 346.50 48.75 94.59 99.92 
1984 51 11754.5 67.17 51 11754.5 67.17   100.00 100.00 
1985 68 7545.1 59.89 67 7655.3 60.27 1 166.00 35.00 98.53 99.97 
1986 119 5118.4 66.12 117 5204.1 66.28 2 104.50 56.65 98.32 99.97 
1987 206 5671.1 59.46 200 5820.2 59.48 6 701.67 58.97 97.09 99.64 
1988 213 7805.1 60.18 204 6625.2 60.51 9 34548.11 52.56 95.77 81.30 
1989 209 4403.6 67.31 197 4591.4 68.18 12 1320.00 53.15 94.26 98.28 
1990 214 2583.7 68.90 192 2747.9 70.19 22 1150.64 57.62 89.72 95.42 
1991 227 6041.9 69.81 191 6755.8 72.57 36 2254.22 55.17 84.14 94.08 
1992 204 4445.9 67.95 163 5309.1 69.94 41 1013.88 60.00 79.90 95.42 
1993 238 7743.3 70.04 168 9479.7 73.63 70 3575.86 61.44 70.59 86.42 
1994 355 1814.5 73.54 269 1633.3 75.53 86 2381.33 67.33 75.77 68.21 
1995 491 2960.7 74.08 354 3009.3 76.33 137 2835.19 68.28 72.10 73.28 
1996 545 4918.1 72.29 422 4975.0 74.26 123 4722.84 65.51 77.43 78.33 
1997 596 5718.4 72.84 406 2969.5 74.40 190 11592.31 69.49 68.12 35.37 
1998 760 10545.6 78.07 563 12962.4 79.85 197 3638.73 72.97 74.08 91.06 
1999 1,426 7415.8 78.13 1,007 7554.3 78.48 419 7083.03 77.30 70.62 71.94 
2000 3,009 2881.4 78.76 2,353 2294.0 80.95 656 4988.44 70.93 78.20 62.26 
2001 1,354 3608.7 82.14 982 1566.0 83.48 372 9000.75 78.60 72.53 31.47 
 10,698   8,306 2392   
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Table 3: Cox proportional hazard model and sensitivity analysis 
 
  Duration analysis sensitivity analysis 
  hazard std err   (normalized duration) 
  ratio for HR p-value coefficient Robust t 
  Constant       2.950 0.59 
  FDI permitted Amount 1.000 0.000 0.293 0.000 1.03 
  Ownership 1.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -3.41 
  Accumulated Acquaintance over  
     Year and country 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -2.20 
  Dummy for Asian Crisis 1.355 0.045 0.000 0.036 1.03 
  Year of permission or registration 0.999 0.003 0.645 -0.001 -0.38 
  Dummy for China 1.083 0.040 0.031 -0.105 -2.54 
  Dummy for Japan 1.032 0.034 0.330 -0.096 -2.81 
  Dummy for U.S. 0.806 0.026 0.000 0.110 3.23 
Dummies for industries      
  Agriculture 0.858 0.204 0.521 0.011 0.06 
  Forestry 0.907 0.288 0.758 0.047 0.21 
  Fishing 0.415 0.121 0.003 0.066 0.49 
  Food products and beverages 0.798 0.073 0.013 0.028 0.34 
  Textiles 1.041 0.090 0.646 0.015 0.16 
  Wood, pulp, paper 0.819 0.130 0.210 -0.006 -0.06 
  Chemicals and Chemical products 0.948 0.059 0.391 0.023 0.35 
  Chemical fertilizer 1.662 0.834 0.312 -0.010 -0.18 
  Medical, precision and optical 1.012 0.119 0.920 -0.007 -0.07 
  Coke, Refined Petroleum products 1.173 0.330 0.569 -0.028 -0.19 
  Rubber and Plastic Products  0.801 0.118 0.134 0.003 0.03 
  Basic Metals 0.560 0.059 0.000 0.014 0.19 
  Fabricated metal products 0.925 0.049 0.141 0.042 0.76 
  Electrical machinery 1.024 0.052 0.639 -0.007 -0.13 
  Motor Vehicles 0.978 0.090 0.812 0.001 0.01 
  Electronic Components 1.103 0.066 0.101 0.000 0.00 
  Electricity, Gas, Steam 0.739 0.214 0.297 -0.055 -0.32 
  General Construction 0.594 0.088 0.000 0.002 0.02 
  Retail Trade 1.149 0.061 0.009 0.035 0.63 
  Wholesale and Commission Trade 1.132 0.041 0.001 0.098 2.51 
  Restaurants 0.818 0.067 0.015 0.066 0.91 
  Hotels 0.365 0.051 0.000 0.006 0.11 
  Transportation 1.041 0.097 0.664 0.011 0.12 
  Financial Institutes 0.817 0.073 0.023 -0.036 -0.49 
  Insurance and pension funding 0.996 0.215 0.984 -0.032 -0.20 
  Real Estate Activities 0.749 0.119 0.069 -0.022 -0.18 
  Observation 10654 10654 
  R-squared       0.01 
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Appendix: 
The Evolution of Korean FDI Regulation 
The regulation of foreign direct investment in Korea underwent five stages of development: 
restricted FDI phase (1962-1972), massive inducement phase (1973-1978), selective inducement 
phase (1979-1983), pre-liberalization phase (1983-1991), and liberalization phase (1992-
present).  
During the restricted FDI phase (1962-1972), Korea experienced successful economic 
growth through two five-year plans. The Foreign Capital Inducement Act of 1960, regarding 
foreign direct investment, gave tax benefits to foreign direct investors. Actual foreign investment 
commitments into Korea rarely occurred, mainly due to political instability. That law was 
amended in 1961 to prohibit several categories of foreign direct investment.24 Furthermore, the 
ownership ratio of investment by foreigners was required to exceed 25 percent of the total shares 
of the company. Remittances were first constrained and then abolished in 1966. Those 
promotional efforts by the Korean government precipitated the first inflows of foreign capital in 
1962.25  
The Korean government established the Masan Free Export Zone in 1970 to promote 
exports, increase employment, and improve technology transfer. In principle, only manufacturing 
companies qualified to reside in the zone, if foreign ownership exceeded 50 percent of the total 
shares of the company. Specific criteria for permission to enter the Free Export Zone induced 
significant improvements in international payments, advancements in technology, increases in 
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24 These categories included investment that led to the squandering of foreign exchange reserves, disturbed the 
stability of the won, led to overproduction, and aimed at either temporary security or speculation. The industries 
where investment was prohibited included industries using atomic energy, munitions manufacturing industries, 
domestic shipping or air transportation industries, and monopoly business.  
25 Chemtex, an American company, invested U.S. $579,000 into the filament nylon business of Korean Nylon Co., 
Ltd., for example. 
  
production, and developments in related industries. In particular, exports were strongly 
encouraged while domestic sales were not. Technological imports or transfers to local Korean 
partners were also encouraged through joint ventures of foreign investors with corresponding 
local partners.26  
The massive inducement phase started in 1973, when the world economy experienced a 
recession and the first oil shock occurred. From late 1972, investment by Japanese companies 
increased remarkably, since Japanese investors became more interested in Korea than Taiwan 
after the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China. With these 
environmental changes, ‘provision for FDI’ was established in February 1972.27 This provision 
determined the minimum investment of U.S. $200,000 and specified a 50-50 ratio between 
domestic and foreign investors to increase domestic participation in management (non-voting 
right stocks on face value exceeding stocks can be issued to foreigners, if necessary).  
The selective inducement phase (1979-1983) started after the second oil shock in late 
1978, which worsened the world economy and efforts at protectionism. In June 1981, provision 
for FDI was again amended to reflect the new economic environment.28 Now, the investment 
must exceed U.S. $100,000, while the related parties mutually agreed to the ownership ratio.  
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26 Partly due to governmental efforts along with fast economic development, foreign direct investment into Korea 
began to increase from 1970. Favored industries included export industries, such as meat processing, product 
processing, and TV manufacturing; and import-substitution industries, such as viscose rayon and chemistry pulp 
manufacturing industries. Restricted industries included legally prohibited industries, such as tobacco producing, 
legally restricted industries, such as shipping service, and politically prohibited industries, such as supply and 
transmission of electric power.  
27 In this phase, qualified industries for foreign investment included metalworking, machine and electronic industry, 
and large scale industries that face difficulties in establishing and operating capital, technologies, and management. 
Export industries that experienced difficulties and inefficiencies with securing their share of the international market 
also qualified.  
28 The qualifying businesses to receive FDI included large-scale processing industries that domestic firms find 
difficult to establish and operate, such as machine engineering, metalworking engineering, electronic engineering, 
electrical engineering, chemistry engineering, and energy business. It also included industries that contribute to the 
development and utilization of domestic natural resources, manufacturing industries, such as food and medicine, 
  
A paradigm shift in Korean FDI policy occurred in 1983. The government changed the 
regulatory framework from a positive to a negative list system. The negative list system 
prohibited or restricted foreign investment in certain sectors (see Table 1). 
During the pre-liberalization with negative list system phase, the government abolished 
the uniform fixed ceiling on foreign direct investment of 50 percent. If the ratio of FDI fell below 
50 percent, the government automatically permitted the FDI. If the ratio of FDI exceeded 50 
percent, the government investigated and evaluated the adequacy of the FDI, determining 
whether to permit it. In terms of tax exemption, foreign investors obtained tax exemption, 
including the corporation tax, the income tax, the property tax, the acquisition tax, and tariffs on 
capitals introduced for the purpose of foreign investment.  
The liberalization phase started in 1992. FDI was permitted, in principle, by filling out 
the appropriate reports, making government approval for foreign investment exceptional. The 
following industries, however, were still restricted from acquiring foreign direct investment: 
public interest related business, industries harmful to health, sanitation, and the preservation of 
environment, industries harmful to laudable customs, and other industries prohibited by 
presidential decree.29  
In particular, after the Asian financial crisis, the Korean government promoted FDI and 
gave it the utmost priority to overcome the economic crisis as well as to cope effectively with 
globalization. Under this new view, the government enacted epochal changes in the Foreign 
Investment Promotion Law, moving it from “control and regulation” to “promotion and support.” 
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distribution industry, service industry, and other industries that the Ministry of the Economic Planning Board 
considers necessities 
29 After Korea joined the OECD in December 1996, the government continued the liberalization process, moving 
toward the levels in advanced countries. The Foreign Capital Inducement Act was amended to become the Foreign 
Direct Investment and Foreign Capital Inducement Act in February 1997, which spelled out policies on FDI, M&A, 
and long-term loans. 
  
Besides, to facilitate foreign direct investment, the Korean government also removed restrictions 
on the use of foreign exchange to permit unlimited access to foreign funding.  
Foreign Direct Investment in Korea by the U.S. Japan, and China: History 
Japan proved the largest FDI investor in Korea since 1962. Most investments occurred in 
industries that manufacture chemical products, basic metals, fabricated metal products and 
electrical machinery, in addition to retail and wholesale trade.30 During the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997, Japan withdrew much capital from Korea, which caused the percentage of realized 
capital to fall to 49.8 percent. These withdrawals possessed average investment higher than those 
of performed projects. Only in 2000 did Japanese investors return to Korea by raising the 
percentage of realized capital to 88.7 percent, which equaled their performance in 1996, the year 
before the crisis. This outcome probably reflects the fact that Japan was heavily affected by the 
regional financial crisis, and it took time for Japan to recover. 
As the second ranked Korean investor, the United States seemed to follow Japanese 
preferences on industries. The largest number of projects (more than 100) belonged to industries 
that manufacture basic metal, such as fabricated metal and motor vehicles, as well as retail and 
wholesale trade. U.S. ownership began high rates, but no ownership pattern existed over time. 
The U.S. shares usually exceeded 60 percent, generally higher than Japan. If investment values 
are considered, however, it is easier to see the influence of the Asian crisis on U.S. investors. The 
percentage of realized capital plummeted to 13 percent in 1997 from 66 percent in 1996, due to 
the withdrawals of large-scale projects. During these years, the majority of small projects were 
disbursed. In 1998, U.S. investment recovered, but dropped again in the years that follow. Note 
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30 The average ownership seemed low in Japan from 1962 to 1969, but slightly increased from 1970 to 1985, 
stabilizing at around 50%, a balanced leverage. From 1986 to 2001, the ownership increased and consistently 
obtained the larger capital share in FDI projects. Fluctuations in the number of projects and the total value of 
invested capital existed throughout the years 
  
that the U.S. did not directly participate in the whirl of the Asian crisis, which facilitated its 
return to the Korean market once some profits appeared probable.  
Unlike the top two investors, China showed less variety in selecting industries, mainly 
concentrating on restaurants, and retail and wholesale trade (e.g., over 100 projects each). Note 
that wholesale trade accounted for about 60 percent of total registered FDI. Since 1989, FDI 
from China steadily increased both in number of projects and in total investment. China did not 
frequently exhibit a high percentage of realized FDI. During the Asian crisis, China also 
withdrew many projects, which made its relative realized number of projects plunge to the 
lowest level ever. Uniquely, China experienced only a small decline in total investment into 
Korea in 1997.31  
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31 China is the only one out of the top three countries that saw the average value of realized projects higher than that 
of withdrawn projects during the crisis period. 
  
 Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable   Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Durana  duration time in years = feasible time – registered time  1.372 2.679 .083 35.666 
Event Censoring, =1 if performed or feasible, =0 if not performed 0.779 0.415 0 1 
Amount FDI permitted amount 5269 46982 1 2961839 
Invratio Ownership or the foreign investment ratio 74.901 31.361 0.03 100 
Ryear year of permission or registration 1996.4 5.9 1962 2001 
china dummy for China 0.196 0.397 0 1 
japan dummy for Japan 0.241 0.428 0 1 
U.S. dummy for U.S. 0.214 0.410 0 1 
crisis Asian Crisis, 1 if ryear>1997 0.611 0.487 0 1 
lagacq accumulated acquaintance over  152.6 246.7 0 1249 
  year by country, indcode     
Ind1 Agriculture 0.002 0.048 0 1 
Ind2  Forestry 0.001 0.035 0 1 
Ind3  Fishing 0.002 0.045 0 1 
Ind4  Manufacture of food products and beverages 0.018 0.131 0 1 
Ind5  Manufacture of textiles 0.018 0.132 0 1 
Ind6  Manufacture of wood, pulp, paper 0.005 0.072 0 1 
Ind7  Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical products 0.039 0.195 0 1 
Ind8   Manufacture of Chemical fertilizer 0.000 0.019 0 1 
Ind9   Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 0.008 0.092 0 1 
Ind10   Manufacture of coke, Refined Petroleum products 0.001 0.036 0 1 
Ind11   Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic Products  0.006 0.075 0 1 
Ind12   Manufacture of Basic Metals 0.016 0.124 0 1 
Ind13   Manufacture of Fabricated metal products 0.063 0.243 0 1 
Ind14   Manufacture of Electrical machinery 0.067 0.251 0 1 
Ind15   Manufacture of Motor Vehicles 0.014 0.119 0 1 
Ind16   Manufacture of Electronic Components 0.045 0.207 0 1 
Ind17   Electricity, Gas, Steam and Hot Water Supply 0.002 0.042 0 1 
Ind18  General Construction 0.008 0.090 0 1 
Ind19  Retail Trade 0.061 0.239 0 1 
Ind20  Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade 0.372 0.483 0 1 
Ind21  Restaurants 0.025 0.155 0 1 
Ind22  Hotels 0.012 0.108 0 1 
Ind23  Transportation 0.015 0.122 0 1 
Ind24  Financial Institutes 0.021 0.144 0 1 
Ind25  Insurance and pension funding 0.003 0.051 0 1 
Ind26  Real Estate Activities 0.006 0.080 0 1 
Ind27  Service Sector 0.169 0.375 0 1 
indcode industry code 18.716 5.902 1 27 
cid country code 38.516 21.263 0 99 
Note: number of observation = 10657     
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Appendix Table 2: Summary statistics by year for Japan 
 
year all cases not performed FDI performed FDI   
  avg avg  avg avg  avg avg % realized % realized 
 No amount own no amount own No amount own no. of FDI capital 
1962 1 32899.0 14.0    1 32899.0 14.0 100.0 100.0 
1963 1 1682.0 21.0    1 1682.0 21.0 100.0 100.0 
1964            
1965            
1966            
1967 2 1436.5 32.0    2 1436.5 32.0 100.0 100.0 
1968 6 5195.5 88.3    6 5195.5 88.3 100.0 100.0 
1969 8 24786.8 28.8    8 24786.8 28.8 100.0 100.0 
1970 17 4155.8 50.4    17 4155.8 50.4 100.0 100.0 
1971 13 6466.5 50.4 1 4293.0 39.6 12 6647.7 51.3 92.3 94.9 
1972 45 3628.3 45.7 1 12038.0 44.6 44 3437.2 45.7 97.8 92.6 
1973 63 12853.8 45.0    63 12853.8 45.0 100.0 100.0 
1974 29 10469.1 41.1 1 1060.0 45.0 28 10805.2 40.9 96.6 99.7 
1975 9 10615.7 26.2    9 10615.7 26.2 100.0 100.0 
1976 12 1852.8 60.3 2 337.0 58.7 10 2155.9 60.6 83.3 97.0 
1977 6 5912.5 36.7    6 5912.5 36.7 100.0 100.0 
1978 12 6660.5 52.8    12 6660.5 52.8 100.0 100.0 
1979 15 1867.7 50.0 1 21.0 9.0 14 1999.6 52.9 93.3 99.9 
1980 10 7494.3 49.4    10 7494.3 49.4 100.0 100.0 
1981 11 3934.8 49.5    11 3934.8 49.5 100.0 100.0 
1982 10 2995.7 60.3    10 2995.7 60.3 100.0 100.0 
1983 18 889.0 49.7 1 120.0 47.5 17 934.2 49.9 94.4 99.3 
1984 24 15641.8 60.6    24 15641.8 60.6 100.0 100.0 
1985 31 1099.4 48.3 1 166.0 35.0 30 1130.5 48.8 96.8 99.5 
1986 68 1776.3 62.5 2 104.5 56.7 66 1827.0 62.7 97.1 99.8 
1987 123 3394.4 55.8 4 528.3 64.0 119 3490.7 55.5 96.7 99.5 
1988 112 4032.7 54.7 6 51743.2 45.8 106 1332.2 55.2 94.6 31.3 
1989 97 1521.5 52.3 5 618.6 64.8 92 1570.6 51.6 94.8 97.9 
1990 100 887.0 56.0 15 1570.7 55.3 85 766.4 56.1 85.0 73.4 
1991 92 3632.0 53.8 22 330.8 46.2 70 4669.5 56.2 76.1 97.8 
1992 63 1093.0 53.1 20 1816.1 49.9 43 756.7 54.6 68.3 47.3 
1993 75 2927.3 61.8 23 7074.1 56.1 52 1093.2 64.3 69.3 25.9 
1994 111 1755.5 63.4 27 3562.4 52.4 84 1174.7 66.9 75.7 50.6 
1995 150 2252.0 66.3 46 1938.1 59.3 104 2390.8 69.4 69.3 73.6 
1996 141 990.6 66.4 26 593.4 60.6 115 1080.4 67.8 81.6 89.0 
1997 124 1010.4 63.9 33 1907.3 65.4 91 685.1 63.3 73.4 49.8 
1998 167 1153.3 72.9 30 2625.0 61.6 137 831.1 75.4 82.0 59.1 
1999 231 6509.1 70.2 62 9569.6 69.5 169 5386.3 70.5 73.2 60.5 
2000 406 4259.8 58.7 102 1924.0 55.1 304 5043.5 59.9 74.9 88.7 
2001 177 1517.4 60.6 61 1118.8 61.5 116 1727.0 60.1 65.5 74.6 
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 Appendix Table 3: Summary statistics by year for U.S.A 
 
year all cases not performed FDI performed FDI % realized % realized 
    avg avg   avg avg   avg avg capital no. of FDI 
  No amount own no amount own no amount own     
1966 3 12372.7 75.0 1 290.0 100.0 2 18414.0 62.5 99.22 66.67 
1967 3 73720.0 50.7 1 289.0 2.2 2 110435.5 75.0 99.87 66.67 
1968 5 14557.6 59.4 1 18.0 100.0 4 18192.5 49.3 99.98 80.00 
1969 3 24122.3 60.0    3 24122.3 60.0 100.00 100.00 
1970 4 1516.8 63.8    4 1516.8 63.8 100.00 100.00 
1971 2 11534.5 100.0    2 11534.5 100.0 100.00 100.00 
1972 1 60.0 35.0    1 60.0 35.0 100.00 100.00 
1973 3 19738.3 58.7    3 19738.3 58.7 100.00 100.00 
1974 4 22228.8 87.1 1 31419.0 98.2 3 19165.3 83.3 64.66 75.00 
1975 2 777.0 28.5    2 777.0 28.5 100.00 100.00 
1976            
1977 2 60024.0 100.0    2 60024.0 100.0 100.00 100.00 
1978 2 6308.5 44.5    2 6308.5 44.5 100.00 100.00 
1979 2 4927.5 37.6    2 4927.5 37.6 100.00 100.00 
1980 4 6615.3 60.3    4 6615.3 60.3 100.00 100.00 
1981 6 368.5 64.8    6 368.5 64.8 100.00 100.00 
1982 8 17015.3 47.4    8 17015.3 47.4 100.00 100.00 
1983 11 67076.6 79.7    11 67076.6 79.7 100.00 100.00 
1984 14 6279.4 68.3    14 6279.4 68.3 100.00 100.00 
1985 22 6257.8 64.3    22 6257.8 64.3 100.00 100.00 
1986 23 11803.0 71.2    23 11803.0 71.2 100.00 100.00 
1987 36 2326.4 65.9    36 2326.4 65.9 100.00 100.00 
1988 60 4027.5 67.6 3 158.0 66.0 57 4231.1 67.6 99.80 95.00 
1989 48 6267.1 83.5 1 293.0 21.8 47 6394.2 84.8 99.90 97.92 
1990 52 3706.3 78.2 3 385.0 76.3 49 3909.7 78.3 99.40 94.23 
1991 62 2793.9 83.9 8 2525.0 71.3 54 2833.7 85.8 88.34 87.10 
1992 53 2762.6 76.7 10 283.0 72.9 43 3339.2 77.6 98.07 81.13 
1993 57 2067.2 74.3 18 722.6 62.4 39 2687.8 79.8 88.96 68.42 
1994 95 2768.5 79.2 23 3957.1 80.5 72 2388.8 78.7 65.40 75.79 
1995 135 3864.9 78.6 36 4931.8 72.5 99 3476.9 80.8 65.97 73.33 
1996 144 4117.6 76.3 35 5814.6 70.7 109 3572.6 78.1 65.68 75.69 
1997 158 11655.3 76.0 52 30706.0 81.7 106 2309.6 73.2 13.29 67.09 
1998 238 10901.9 78.5 69 6276.4 71.5 169 12790.4 81.4 83.31 71.01 
1999 343 5371.7 74.0 128 8937.8 70.5 215 3248.7 76.1 37.91 62.68 
2000 486 3722.1 62.7 169 7652.6 58.8 317 1626.7 64.8 28.51 65.23 
2001 193 1613.4 70.3 75 2496.6 72.9 118 1052.1 68.7 39.87 61.14 
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Appendix Table 4: Summary statistics by year for China 
 
Year all cases not performed FDI performed FDI 
% 
realized % realized  
    avg avg   avg avg   avg avg capital no. of FDI 
  No amount own No amount own no amount own     
1989 1 121.0 49.0    1 121.0 49.0 100.0 100.0 
1990 2 74.0 70.0    2 74.0 70.0 100.0 100.0 
1991 3 230.0 46.7    3 230.0 46.7 100.0 100.0 
1992 6 206.8 59.3 2 147.5 58.5 4 236.5 59.8 76.2 66.7 
1993 27 204.9 65.6 10 371.9 62.8 17 106.6 67.2 32.8 63.0 
1994 30 180.4 72.0 9 153.1 58.6 21 192.1 77.8 74.5 70.0 
1995 40 262.5 80.9 18 329.4 85.3 22 207.8 77.2 43.5 55.0 
1996 54 94.6 75.5 22 95.4 65.5 32 94.2 82.4 59.0 59.3 
1997 64 105.9 69.8 36 82.2 58.6 28 136.5 84.2 56.4 43.8 
1998 83 66.7 84.9 33 72.6 82.7 50 62.7 86.4 56.7 60.2 
1999 292 105.6 89.7 80 156.7 88.1 212 86.4 90.3 59.4 72.6 
2000 1,054 67.3 91.9 161 81.5 87.5 893 64.8 92.7 81.5 84.7 
2001 455 72.4 91.0 77 142.1 92.9 378 58.2 90.6 66.8 83.1 
 
Appendix Table 5: Ranking of investors in Korea by number of projects 
 
 
all cases performed FDI 
% 
realized  % 
Name 
Country 
code   Average Total average   average total average in no. of  realized 
country   count Amount Amount ownership count amount amount ownership project capital 
Japan 32 2,580 3439.5 8873845.5 59.90 2,088 3404.9 7109456.3 60.20 80.93 80.12 
U.S.A 68 2,284 5760.8 13157655.8 72.44 1,650 4825.0 7961255.0 73.78 72.24 60.51 
China 14 2,111 83.3 175838.0 89.02 1,663 72.4 120477.0 90.53 78.78 68.52 
Pakistan 51 676 52.3 35330.0 99.07 528 51.6 27226.0 99.02 78.11 77.06 
Germany 21 317 13413.4 4252041.5 79.20 265 15696.1 4159466.5 80.09 83.60 97.82 
Netherlands 47 238 34103.7 8116685.4 84.08 214 36992.2 7916330.8 85.29 89.92 97.53 
 
 
Appendix Table 6: Ranking of investors in Korea by investment value of projects 
 
country   all cases performed FDI 
% 
realized %  
Name 
Country 
code   average Total average   average total average in no of realized 
   count amount Amount ownership count amount amount ownership project capital 
U.S.A 68 2,284 5760.8 13157655.8 72.44 1,650 4825.0 7961255.0 73.78 72.24 60.51 
Japan 32 2,580 3439.5 8873845.5 59.90 2,088 3404.9 7109456.3 60.20 80.93 80.12 
Netherlands 47 238 34103.7 8116685.4 84.08 214 36992.2 7916330.8 85.29 89.92 97.53 
Malaysia 41 211 20437.7 4312352.6 49.15 159 21633.6 3439742.4 50.49 75.36 79.76 
Germany 21 317 13413.4 4252041.5 79.20 265 15696.1 4159466.5 80.09 83.60 97.82 
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Appendix Table 7: The industries that attract the number of projects larger than 100 from Japan 
Industry  
code All approved cases performed FDI  % 
  No. avg   avg No. avg   avg performed  
    amount tamount own   amount tamount own Capital  
27 414 1825.3 755685.8 57.5 322 1688.3 543645.2 59.3 71.94 
13 367 1273.2 467265.1 55.6 304 1456.1 442668.1 55.7 94.74 
20 357 784.7 280152.0 79.4 287 950.2 272699.0 81.2 97.34 
14 265 3680.5 975323.0 53.8 241 3926.2 946217.1 54.3 97.02 
16 202 984.2 198817.0 52.1 167 1118.4 186778.0 52.3 93.94 
7 182 5012.6 912293.9 50.1 163 5488.9 894689.1 49.3 98.07 
19 165 881.4 145432.0 75.8 131 1030.3 134968.0 74.4 92.80 
Note: See Appendix Table 1 for names of industries  
 
Appendix Table 8: The industries that attract the biggest total amount of foreign investment from Japan 
 
 
 
Appendi
x Table 
9: The 
industrie
s attract 
most 
projects 
and 
capitals 
from 
U.S.A 
all approved cases performed FDI % 
No avg total  Avg no avg   avg Realized 
Industry  
code 
  
    amount amount Own   amount Tamount own Capital 
22 51 48773.3 2487438.8 71.5 26 62984.3 1637591.0 67.3 65.83 
14 265 3680.5 975323.0 53.8 241 3926.2 946217.1 54.3 97.02 
7 182 5012.6 912293.9 50.1 163 5488.9 894689.1 49.3 98.07 
23 30 27065.3 811958.1 67.9 22 25495.3 560897.0 68.0 69.08 
27 414 1825.3 755685.8 57.5 322 1688.3 543645.2 59.3 71.94 
24 34 13891.0 472293.0 42.0 26 16391.0 426165.0 44.3 90.23 
13 367 1273.2 467265.1 55.6 304 1456.1 442668.1 55.7 94.74 
Industry 
code all cases performed FDI %  
   avg   avg   avg   Avg Realized 
 No. amount tamount own No. amount tamount Own capital 
27 689 3651.3 2515776.7 72.5 499 2033.3 1014616.2 74.2 40.33 
20 431 715.1 308195.0 86.6 333 866.4 288497.0 86.9 93.61 
13 217 7403.4 1606533.0 63.1 157 9441.7 1482340.0 63.9 92.27 
19 150 8580.9 1287140.1 83.4 107 11071.0 1184594.9 83.4 92.03 
15 127 1092.1 138694.0 58.3 93 1298.1 120724.0 58.1 87.04 
12 111 3401.7 377585.0 65.4 91 2652.8 241404.0 68.1 63.93 
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Appendix Table 10: The industries attracting most projects and capitals from China 
Industry 
code all cases   performed FDI %  
   Avg   avg   avg   avg actual 
 No Amount tamount own no amount tamount own capital 
20 1,621 63.7 103306.0 93.8 1,341 62.4 83662.0 94.1 80.98 
21 119 104.8 12466.0 77.0 78 106.4 8301.0 77.7 66.59 
19 103 59.8 6161.0 86.3 78 60.0 4682.0 89.6 75.99 
27 96 156.5 15025.0 75.4 65 160.3 10422.0 75.6 69.36 
Note: See Appendix Table 1 for names of industries 
 
Appendix Table 11: Summary statistics by industry, sorting by the number of realized projects 
  all cases performed FDI % realized % 
Industry 
code   Average total  average   average total average in no of realized 
 count Amount Amount ownership count amount amount ownership projects capital 
20 3,986 429.1 1710532.9 91.55 3,203 496.9 1591587.0 92.03 80.36 93.05 
27 1,806 5529.9 9987069.8 68.92 1,364 2929.8 3996278.6 70.39 75.53 40.01 
14 723 7477.5 5406249.1 54.73 589 8522.1 5019521.6 55.09 81.47 92.85 
13 671 4918.5 3300290.7 60.62 551 5490.7 3025359.7 61.12 82.12 91.67 
19 651 5372.0 3497181.1 81.88 506 6447.8 3262573.1 82.89 77.73 93.29 
16 480 2463.3 1182375.8 55.04 369 3074.5 1134504.2 55.28 76.88 95.95 
7 421 9335.4 3930200.0 63.62 352 10404.6 3662401.6 64.01 83.61 93.19 
 
Appendix Table 12: Summary statistics by industry, sorting by total amount of invested capital 
  all cases performed FDI % realized % 
Industry 
code   average Total  average   average total average in no of  realized 
 Count amount amount ownership count amount amount ownership projects capital 
14 723 7477.5 5406249.1 54.73 589 8522.1 5019521.6 55.09 81.47 92.85 
24 226 24881.7 5623268.7 58.38 143 30470.3 4357255.8 59.02 63.27 77.49 
27 1,806 5529.9 9987069.8 68.92 1,364 2929.8 3996278.6 70.39 75.53 40.01 
7 421 9335.4 3930200.0 63.62 352 10404.6 3662401.6 64.01 83.61 93.19 
19 651 5372.0 3497181.1 81.88 506 6447.8 3262573.1 82.89 77.73 93.29 
13 671 4918.5 3300290.7 60.62 551 5490.7 3025359.7 61.12 82.12 91.67 
4 188 13810.5 2596364.6 59.95 136 18146.4 2467910.4 60.96 72.34 95.05 
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